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Abstract— While some process philosophers have denigrated the emergent theory of mind, what they have 
denigrated has been ‘materialist’ theories of emergence. My contention is that one of the most important 
reasons for embracing process philosophy is that it is required to make intelligible the emergence of 
consciousness. There is evidence that this was a central concern of Whitehead. However, Whitehead 
acknowledged that his metaphysics was deficient in this regard. In this paper I will argue that to fully 
understand the emergent theory of mind and its relation to process philosophy it is necessary to recast the 
whole history of modern philosophy in terms of efforts by philosophers grappling with the relationship 
between mind and body, or more broadly, consciousness and nature. This will involve granting a central place 
to Schelling’s philosophy, the ideas that influenced it and how Schelling’s insights were developed by 
subsequent philosophers. Process philosophy will then be seen as the tradition generated by efforts to 
transcend the opposition between idealism and materialism, and its promise in this regard, apart from 




In The Mind and its Place in Nature, published in 
1926, C.D. Broad characterized ‘Reductive 
Materialism in general and strict Behaviourism in 
particular’ as ‘instances of the numerous class of 
theories which are so preposterously silly that only 
very learned men could have thought of them’ (623). 
John Searle, in The Rediscovery of Mind, expressed 
much the same sentiments not only about eliminative 
materialism and behaviourism, but also about identity 
and functionalist theories of mind (1992, chap.1). 
Given what we know with reasonable certainty about 
the evolution of the universe and of earth, that life 
evolved from a world in which there was no life and 
that humans, characterized by complex cultures and 
reflexive consciousness, evolved from simpler forms 
of life, both might equally have said that the emergent 
theory of mind, which each defended, is so obviously 
true in one form or another that only highly educated 
people could fail to accept some version of it. The 
universe must be seen as creative, generating new 
kinds of beings that are more than the conditions of 
their emergence. As Conwy Lloyd Morgan, the 
philosopher who coined the notion of emergence, put 
it, ‘the orderly sequence [of natural events], 
historically viewed, appears to present, from time to 
time, something genuinely new. Under what I here 
call emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming 
of the new’ (Lloyd Morgan, 1923, p.1). New beings 
have new qualities not predictable from antecedent 
events, these qualities being the expression of ‘a 
system of intrinsic relatedness’ (p.19). Lloyd Morgan 
argued that ‘what is supervenient at any emergent 
stage of evolutionary progress is a new kind of 
relatedness – new terms in new relations – hitherto 
not in being. In virtue of such new kinds of 
relatedness, not only have natural entities new 
qualities within their own proper being, but new 
properties in relation to other entities’ (p.19). Rather 
than examining the relationship between mind and 
body or thoughts and the brain, the proper way to 
understand the relationship between human 
consciousness and the rest of nature is to investigate 
each of the various emergent levels of being, 
including different forms of life, which have preceded 
the emergence of human consciousness. The 
emergent theory of mind is presented as part of a 
general theory of emergent evolution. 
Where do process philosophers stand on this issue? 
Most process philosophers influenced by Whitehead 
are concerned to defend pan-experientialism, and 
have been dismissive of the emergent theory of mind. 
Charles Birch and John Cobb exemplify this attitude 
(Birch and Cobb, 77-9). However, what these thinkers 
are really opposing is materialist versions of theories 
of emergence; that is, the claim that since 
configurations of matter can have properties not 
found in the components of these configurations, then 
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it is possible that more complex configurations could 
have the properties of sentience and even 
consciousness. Just as with water the property of 
wetness is not contained in either hydrogen or 
oxygen, so brains can have consciousness although 
this property is not contained in its component cells. 
While less crude, the emergent theories of mind of 
John Searle and most of the members of the Santa Fe 
Institute are of this kind (Searle, 1992, p.111f; 
Crutchfield, 1994). They still assume an essentially 
materialist or mechanist view of the physical world. 
What process philosophers question, and here they are 
at one with other opponents of the emergent theory of 
mind, is how any arrangement of matter or interaction 
between bits of matter conceived as extended bodies 
could give rise to anything like experience or 
consciousness. 
But as Broad pointed out, there are different versions 
of emergentism. ‘Emergent materialism’ he 
characterized as the doctrine holding that 
‘[m]ateriality is a differentiating attribute, and 
mentality is an emergent characteristic’. This is the 
version of emergentism to which process philosophers 
are opposed. ‘Emergent mentalism’ is the doctrine 
holding that ‘Mentality is a differentiating attribute, 
and materiality an emergent characteristic’. This is 
usually associated with idealism and in recent years 
has rarely been taken seriously. ‘Emergent 
neutralism’ is the doctrine holding that ‘[n]either 
mentality nor materiality is a differentiating attribute, 
but both are emergent characteristics’ (p.632). 
Elaborating on this third form of emergentism, Broad 
argued that the neutral ‘stuff’ from which materiality 
and mentality emerge ‘must be supposed (a) to have 
some of the factors included in materiality and none 
of those included in mentality; or (b) to have some of 
the factors included in mentality and none of those 
included in materiality; or (c) to combine some of the 
factors of mentality with some of the factors of 
materiality’ (p.633). Although the notion of ‘stuff’ is 
problematic and should perhaps be replaced by the 
notion of basic existents, in my view, emergent 
neutralism is not only compatible with process 
philosophy, it is characteristic of it, and the different 
ways of conceiving the basic existents correspond to 
different versions of process philosophy. Ivor 
Leclerc’s version of process philosophy (Leclerc, 
1972, 1986) is closer to the first version, (a), while 
David Ray Griffin’s version is closer to the second 
version, (b). Significantly, most of the early 
proponents of the theory of emergence were emergent 
neutralists, and tended to conceive the basic existents 
as processes. 
 
II. THE EMERGENT THEORY OF MIND AND 
WHITEHEAD 
What then was the relationship between Whitehead’s 
metaphysics and the emergent theory of mind? To 
appreciate this it is necessary to first look at the early 
proponents of the theory of emergence. 
While Conwy Lloyd Morgan was the first person to 
articulate the notion of emergence, it was immediately 
taken up and developed as part of a new metaphysical 
system by Samuel Alexander who presented his ideas 
in the Gifford Lectures of 1916 and 1918. These were 
published in 1920 as Alexander’s magnum opus, 
Space, Time and Deity. Lloyd Morgan was strongly 
influenced by this work, and further developed his 
version of the theory in the Gifford Lectures of 1922 
and 1923 and published in 1923 and 1925 as 
Emergent Evolution and Life, Mind and Spirit.  
Alexander started by postulating pure motions 
characterized as space-time instants. He characterized 
time as the mind of space, although he rejected the 
notion that ‘time is mind or any lowest degree of 
mind’ (Space, Time and Deity, II, p.44). From this 
starting point Alexander attempted to characterize the 
emergence of matter, first with its primary qualities, 
later, with its secondary qualities, then life, mind and 
deity. His theory was basically a form of neutral 
emergentism if type (a), taking the neutral basic 
existents to have some of the properties of materiality 
and none of those of mentality; and it was also a form 
of process philosophy.  
Lloyd Morgan rejected Alexander’s notions of space-
time, arguing that there is no spatio-temporal 
relatedness apart from events. Events are the basic 
existents, but there are specific kinds ‘of integral 
relatedness of which the constitutive characters of 
each member of the group is an emergent expression’ 
(1923, p.7). The new kind of relatedness associated 
with such emergent levels then supervenes over the 
lower events. By virtue of the supervenience of the 
higher levels, systems are characterized by immanent 
causation or self-causation, which Lloyd Morgan 
distinguished from transeunt causation or causation 
by extrinsic conditions. Lloyd Morgan also argued 
that ‘there are no physical systems, of integral status, 
that are not also psychical systems; and no psychical 
systems that are not also physical systems. All 
systems of events are in their degree psycho-physical’ 
(p.26). Lloyd Morgan’s theory then appears to be a 
form of neutral emergentism of type c. Lloyd Morgan 
always spoke of the world as consisting of events and 
systems of events and was strongly influenced by the 
evolutionary notions of Bergson and Alexander. He 
also was a process philosopher of sorts. 
Whitehead appears to have taken Lloyd Morgan’s 
work as a point of departure, seeing it as defining the 
problems to be solved. Lloyd Morgan was familiar 
with Whitehead’s book, the Concept of Nature, 
drawing from it and criticizing it. He considered 
sympathetically Whitehead’s characterization of 
objects as universal and timeless elements of reality 
which ingress in the events of nature, but attacked 
Whitehead for attempting in this work to characterize 
nature as a closed system independent of the knower. 
He noted that while Whitehead claimed to ‘leave to 
metaphysics the synthesis of the known and the 
known’ (p.44), he continually used expressions such 
as ‘disclosed to sense awareness’ (p.235). It was 
shortly after this, in 1925, that Whitehead published 
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Science and the Modern World, the first published 
work where he adopted what he called a 
‘metaphysical’ standpoint (p.157). Whitehead 
acknowledged his indebtedness to only two thinkers, 
Lloyd Morgan and Alexander. ‘There has been no 
occasion in the text to make detailed reference to 
Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent Evolution or to 
Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity’, he wrote. ‘It will 
appear obvious to the readers that I have found them 
very suggestive’ (p.viii). Here, in what Lewis Ford 
refers to as the first metaphysical synthesis (Ford, 
chap.2), Lloyd Morgan’s notion of evolution is most 
clearly evident. It is here that he argues, very much in 
accordance with Lloyd Morgan’s notion of a 
hierarchy of supervenient kinds of relatedness, that 
‘[t]he concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that 
the plan of the whole influences the very character of 
the various subordinate organisms which enter into it’ 
(p.79).  
In 1927-28 Whitehead gave his own Gifford Lectures, 
published as his magnum opus, Process and Reality: 
An Essay in Cosmology in 1929. While this work 
makes no mention of Lloyd Morgan and mentions 
Alexander only twice, and to some extent abandons 
ideas presented in Science in the Modern World, it 
was clearly a continuation of the tradition of Lloyd 
Morgan and Alexander committed to developing a 
coherent evolutionary cosmology which would 
overcome the dualism between the physical and the 
mental and make the emergence of consciousness 
intelligible.  
In the mature metaphysics, the basic existents of the 
universe are ‘actual occasions’, corresponding to 
Lloyd Morgan’s ‘events’. The coining of this term 
was part of a quest by Whitehead, who emphasized 
that he was not a panpsychist, for a language neutral 
between the mental and the physical. Actual 
occasions, characterized as ‘concrescences’ of 
‘prehensions’ of anterior actual occasions and of 
possibilities of definiteness or ‘eternal objects’, 
satisfying themselves in a decision by which all 
indetermination is eliminated, are both subject and 
object, physical and mental: ‘An occasion is a subject 
in respect to its special activity concerning an object; 
and anything is an object in respect to its provocation 
of some special activity within a subject’ he wrote. 
‘Each occasion has its physical inheritance and its 
mental reaction which drives it on to its self-
completion’ (1933, p.176 & 190). Whitehead clarified 
his intention to avoid the dualism between the 
physical and the mental in his last major work, Modes 
of Thought. ‘For some, nature is mere appearance and 
mind is the sole reality. For others, physical nature is 
the sole reality and mind is an epiphenomenona’, he 
wrote. ‘The Doctrine that I am maintaining is that 
neither physical nature nor life can be understood 
unless we fuse them together as essential factors in 
the composition of “really real” things whose 
interconnections and individual characters constitute 
the universe’ (p.150).  
A group of actual occasions, exhibiting a common 
function by virtue their mutual immanence, is a 
nexus. When a nexus is ‘self-sustaining’, that is, ‘is its 
own reason’ (Whitehead, 1933, p.203), it is a society 
(corresponding to Lloyd Morgan’s ‘self-causing 
system of events’). Whitehead’s analysis of the 
relationship between actual occasions and societies 
offers an explanation of Lloyd Morgan’s notion of 
‘integral relatedness of which the constitutive 
characters of each member of the group is an 
emergent expression’. Societies share in some type of 
social order by virtue of a ‘common element of form 
illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included 
actual entities’ due to ‘the conditions imposed upon 
[each actual entity] by its prehension of some other 
members of the nexus’ (p.203). The condition of 
reproduction of these actual occasions is their 
‘inclusion of positive feelings involving that common 
form’ (p.203). Societies can form into larger societies. 
These provide the appropriate environment for their 
constituent societies: ‘A structured society as a whole 
provides a favourable environment for the subordinate 
societies which it harbours within itself. Also the 
whole society must be set in a wider environment 
permissive of its continuance’ (1978, p.99). Societies 
can be lifeless bodies or living bodies with mentalities 
of various grades according to their effect on their 
component actual occasions. Whitehead observed: 
… it seems that, in bodies that are obviously 
living, a coordination has been achieved that raises 
into prominence some functioning inherent in the 
ultimate occasions. For lifeless matter these 
functionings thwart each other, and average out so as 
to produce a negligible total effect. In the case of 
living bodies the coordination intervenes. And the 
average effect of these intimate functionings has to 
be taken into account. … [I]n a man, the living body 
is permeated by living societies of low-grade 
occasions so far as mentality is concerned. But the 
whole is coordinated so as to support a personal 
living society of high-grade occasions (1933, 
p.207f.). 
So, as Whitehead wrote in Process and Reality, while 
‘[f]or Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for 
the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from 
the world’ (p.88).  
However, Whitehead’s efforts in this regard might be 
taken as precluding real emergence. A.H. Johnson, a 
student of Whitehead whose research was devoted to 
interpreting his philosophy, suggested this to 
Whitehead. Johnson argued that Whitehead had 
defined societies of actual occasions in a way that the 
only novel qualities are those found in one component 
actual entity or in a series of actual entities. 
Whitehead responded that he ‘should have introduced 
a Category of “Emergence of Novelty”.’ Johnson 
recounted Whitehead’s further reflections on this: 
In the doctrine (category) of ‘transmutation’ he tried 
to approach it, but didn’t succeed. Under the 
headings: Extension; Proposition; Coordinate 
Division – it might have been considered. It comes 
under the heading of “Whereness”. Whitehead 
pointed out that, though he hasn’t formulated a 
Category of ‘Emergence’ … he had noted the fact of 
‘pattern of society’ – the pattern being not an 
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element in any one component [actual entity] (1963, 
p.53). 
Clearly Whitehead was attempting to develop a 
version of emergent neutralism of type (c) in which 
the basic existents that constitute material objects and 
high order mentalities have some of the 
characteristics of materiality and some of mentality, 
but was not entirely happy with what he had achieved.  
 
III. PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEORIES OF 
EMERGENCE 
What is the significance of this close relation between 
Whitehead and the early proponents of the notion of 
emergence? More fundamentally, what is the 
relationship between process philosophy and theories 
of emergence? My contention is that the effort to 
provide the basis for a theory of emergence captures 
the core of modern process philosophy. It is a 
continuation of what Lovejoy characterized as the 
revolt against the dualism introduced into philosophy 
by Descartes (Lovejoy, 1960). Descartes was 
primarily interested in reformulating our conception 
of physical existence as res extensa to facilitate its 
analysis through the new mathematics of analytical 
geometry. Unlike Hobbes, Descartes appreciated that 
if physical existence were so conceived, mind or 
consciousness would be unintelligible. Mind was 
characterized as res cogitans, conceived of as 
essentially distinct from physical existence, making 
the relationship between mind and matter 
unintelligible. While Descartes successfully 
inaugurated a new era in which mathematical physics 
became the paradigm and foundation for all other 
knowledge, by problematizing ‘consciousness’ he 
also generated a counter-tradition of thought centred 
on the assumption of the primary reality of 
consciousness. Since the seventeenth century large 
numbers of philosophers and scientists have taken the 
material world as conceived by Descartes, or as it was 
reformulated by Newton, as their point of departure 
and striven to explain everything, including society 
and human consciousness, in terms consistent with 
mathematical physics. This is the tradition, usually, 
although perhaps not correctly, thought to have begun 
with Hobbes (Herbert, 1989, chap.2), which 
Whitehead characterized as scientific materialism. 
Along with mainstream economists and 
psychologists, socio-biologists and philosophers such 
as Daniel Dennett, the majority of scientists, are 
continuing to develop and defend this research 
project. 
This tradition has been opposed by other philosophers 
and some scientists taking individual or social 
consciousness as their primary reference point, 
explaining the realm of nature as a mental, cultural or 
spiritual construct. They do not accept the ontological 
implications of the scientific view of the world at face 
value. Often dismissed by their opponents as idealists, 
this tradition includes Vico, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, 
Hegel, theorists of hermeneutics, neo-Kantians, 
Hegelian Marxists, and some of the pragmatists, 
phenomenologists and ordinary language 
philosophers. This is a much less coherent tradition of 
thought than scientific materialism, divided between 
those who assume that consciousness is individual or 
transcendental and those who argue that it is 
essentially social, cultural or spiritual, and between 
those who assume that consciousness is contemplative 
and those who insist that praxis precedes reflective or 
theoretical thinking. What all such thinkers have in 
common is a refusal to be bound by the categories of 
reductionist science and a determination to do justice 
to the creativity and freedom of consciousness.  
Finally, there is a smaller tradition of thought that 
acknowledges the achievements of so-called 
‘idealists’ and the inconsistency of the way they have 
construed consciousness with the way the physical 
world is construed by the mainstream of scientists, 
but who still wish to take nature or the physical world 
rather than consciousness as their primary reference 
point for making the world intelligible. Much bolder 
than the ‘idealists’, these are the philosophers and 
scientists who have argued that whatever its 
achievements, the mainstream tradition of science 
must be fundamentally wrong, that nature must be 
such that consciousness and free agency, fully 
appreciated as such, can be conceived as part of 
nature. This requires that at least some of the central 
characteristics of consciousness must be central 
characteristics of all that exists, including non-living 
physical entities. Accordingly, they have called for a 
transformation or revolution in science on the basis of 
a new conception of nature from which consciousness 
could evolve.  
Clearly there are complexities and anomalies papered 
over by such a schematic characterization of modern 
thought. Yet, despite such anomalies, my contention 
is that the history of modern philosophy and science 
only becomes properly intelligible when construed in 
this way. That is, it is only from the perspective of the 
ontological division introduced by Descartes, the 
achievements and failures of philosophers who 
embraced one or the other side of this dualism, and 
the slowly developing tradition of efforts to overcome 
this division by proposing something like emergence, 
that the achievements and limitations of the work of 
scientists and philosophers of the past three and half 
centuries become intelligible. Such a history requires 
a reassessment of past philosophers, particularly those 
rejecting both scientific materialism and ‘idealism’. It 
is through such a history that the relationships 
between a vast range of philosophers and scientists, 
normally viewed in isolation from each other, can be 
properly understood and the work of Alexander, 
Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead placed in context and 
properly evaluated. That is, what is offered here is the 
sketch of a revisionist history of philosophy in 
general, and the basis of what I believe to be a more 
coherent history of process philosophy than has been 
offered hitherto, culminating in a successful account 
of the emergence of mind. 
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IV. PRECURSORS TO THE THEORY OF EMERGENCE: 
FROM LEIBNIZ TO SCHELLING 
Lloyd Morgan acknowledged a number of thinkers 
who contributed to his theory of emergence. He was 
strongly influenced by Henri Bergson, Herbert 
Spencer, E.G. Spaulding and Walter T. Marvin, but 
also acknowledged John Stuart Mill, G.H. Lewes and 
the psychologists Wundt and McDougal as having 
contributed essential components to the theory (1923, 
p.2ff.). However, if we consider the theory of 
emergence, and by virtue of this, a process view of 
the world, as part of the strategy to conceive nature 
such that consciousness can be conceived to be part of 
it, then it is clear that this strategy has a much longer 
history. It originated with Leibniz. Reacting to both 
Descartes’ metaphysics and to Newton’s cosmology, 
Leibniz conceived the primary existents of the world 
as proto-conscious monads, each striving for 
perfection. Temporal unfolding was seen to be central 
to the very being of monads, while spatial and 
temporal continua were treated as derivative and as 
abstractions from particular existents. ‘Space is 
nothing but the order of the existence of things 
possible at the same time’, Leibniz wrote, ‘while time 
is the order of existence of things possible 
successively’ (1969, p.536). Bodies as extended 
beings were also conceived as derivative aspects of 
reality. The world as conceived by mechanics then 
was seen not as grasping the core of physical 
existence, but as pertaining to appearances. Still, on 
the basis of his metaphysics, Leibniz argued against 
central ideas of the physics of Descartes and Newton. 
Seeing nature as essentially active, Leibniz postulated 
a universal vis viva, and in accordance with this, 
argued against Newton that the conservation of 
kinetic energy rather than the conservation of 
momentum should be taken as the basic principle of 
mechanics. And he suggested that the cosmos should 
be seen as evolving to higher and higher levels. 
We can see here the basic argument for process 
philosophy. Leibniz appreciated that extended matter 
as conceived by Descartes, or matter located in space 
as conceived by Newton, are incompatible with any 
conceivable notion of consciousness. So he took 
consciousness as his point of departure and, having 
identified its essential properties, characterized all 
existence in these terms and then attempted to show 
how bodies in motion could be construed as 
derivative of such a world. Most importantly, Leibniz 
appreciated that consciousness is first and foremost 
active; it is in process, or is a process of becoming. 
However, he also ascribed perception to these 
processes. Leibniz postulated that the basic existents 
of the world or ‘monads’ are processes of perceiving 
so that the higher levels of consciousness could be 
seen as particular states of these basic existents. He 
then tried to show that the appearance of bodies, 
space and time could be explained through these 
monads, at the same time explaining how this world 
of bodies could be analyzable through mathematics; 
that is, Leibniz gave an account of how mathematical 
physics was possible in a world of mental processes. 
In doing so, he made important contributions to 
mathematics and to mathematical physics. Thus, in 
order to give a proper place to the reality of 
consciousness, Leibniz developed a metaphysics 
privileging processes over things designed to account 
for, and in fact further develop, mathematical physics.  
However, Leibniz did not develop a theory of how 
minds could emerge from the inanimate world. His 
monads were immortal windowless minds, 
completely autonomous from each other, developing 
in pre-established harmony. The development of mind 
was seen as a difference in the degree of 
consciousness of these monads, not a difference in 
kind. Bodies, space and time are not the primary 
existents from which minds evolved, but mere 
appearances for the intellect. What is emerging is the 
experience of bodies, space and time from the 
monads. This is an example of what Broad 
characterized as emergent mentalism.  
This is the direction that Kant developed Leibniz’s 
philosophy. As we all know, Kant argued that the 
sensory manifold which we come to experience as 
objects located in space, changing their positions over 
time, and causally interacting with each other, is 
experienced this way not because this is how the 
world really is, but because this is how the 
transcendental ego organizes experience. The sensory 
manifold is organized by imagination, the forms of 
intuition (space and time) and the categories and 
concepts of the understanding (including the category 
of ‘causality and dependence’). Since it is through 
such organizing activity that we can know anything, 
we have no basis for knowing the things in 
themselves, the ‘noumenal realm’ behind the sensory 
manifold. Only the free moral will gives us some 
intimation of what this real world might be like. 
Kant’s arguments, rather than those of Berkeley or 
Hume, have been the main source of inspiration for 
the development of various forms of ‘idealism’.  
But there was more to Kant than this. Not only did 
Kant contribute greatly to analyzing the nature of 
consciousness, throughout his life he adhered to 
Leibniz’s notion that nature is essentially active 
(Kant, 1985). He contributed to the development of 
dynamism, arguing that nature does not consist of 
atoms but of centers of force (p.44). He also 
conceived of nature as having evolved and speculated 
on the formation of the solar system. He was 
interested in biology, introduced the notion of 
‘community’ of causation in the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason and defended functionalist or 
teleological explanations of living processes in the 
Critique of Judgement (although here he explicitly 
ruled out a theory of emergence). Kant contributed to 
the development of a new conception of nature. 
To Kant’s students such as Herder, this work was far 
more important to philosophy than Kant’s critical 
philosophy and his critique of metaphysics (Nisbet, 
1970). Developing Leibniz’s and Kant’s notion of a 
dynamic nature, embracing Kant’s conception of 
human consciousness as active, but construing this 
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consciousness as social rather than individual and 
active rather than contemplative, Herder sketched out 
a conception of nature and of human history which 
contains almost all the elements of what has become 
the tradition of process philosophy. The central 
concept of Herder’s philosophy of nature was Kraft, 
or dynamic, purpose-seeking forces. Contrary to 
Leibniz’s philosophy, these were seen as flowing into 
each other, clashing, combining and coalescing to 
generate new kinds of beings. That is, Herder 
sketched a view of nature within which life, human 
history and mind could be seen as emergent 
phenomena, although the details of what was involved 
in emergence were never fully developed, and Herder 
did not grapple with the fundamental philosophical 
problems of such a theory (Nisbet, 1970).  
Schelling, who began his career as a disciple of 
Kant’s disciple Fichte, broke with Fichte and, 
drawing upon the work of Spinoza, Aristotle and 
radical neo-Platonists such as Boehme and Bruno, 
circumvented Kant’s strictures on metaphysics and 
developed with far greater rigor Herder’s cosmology 
(Schelling, 1994, pp.114-133; Hegel, 1995, p.514). 
This involved formulating what can only be 
characterized as a highly developed form of process 
metaphysics containing a theory of emergence. 
Herder and Schelling were closely aligned with and 
helped inspire German Romanticism and influenced a 
vast range of other thinkers in science, history, 
theology and philosophy. Schelling’s philosophy 
therefore provides the key to understanding not only 
the history of modern process philosophy, but of post-
mechanistic science and most of modern (and 
postmodern) philosophy. 
 
V. SCHELLING AS PROCESS PHILOSOPHER AND 
THEORIST OF EMERGENCE 
Schelling named one of his major works System of 
Transcendental Idealism and is usually characterized 
as an idealist. However, while this work was designed 
to analyze and elaborate the categories through which 
the ego understands the world, it was not meant to be 
a self-sufficient philosophy. Like Whitehead, 
Schelling opposed both the approach that takes the 
objective as primary and attempts to show how a 
subjective is annexed to it, and the converse approach 
that takes the subjective as primary and takes as its 
problem to show how an objective supervenes. 
Arguing for a transcendence of this opposition, he 
argued that the self-conscious ‘I’ needs to be 
explained, ultimately as the product and highest 
potentiality of nature. Transcendental philosophy 
therefore needs to be complemented by a philosophy 
of nature (Schelling, 1988), ‘both sciences together 
are [required]’ (1978, p.2). Schelling claimed that his 
philosophy was ‘neither materialism nor spiritualism, 
neither realism nor idealism’ but contained within 
itself ‘the opposition of all earlier systems’ (1994, 
p.120). Later, he argued for the priority of the 
philosophy of nature over transcendental idealism 
(Bowie, 1993, p.57). Nature must be conceived as 
capable, at its highest level of development, of giving 
rise to the self-conscious subject that could arrive at 
knowledge of nature. But such knowledge is 
inherently limited, Schelling concluded. As Michael 
Vater summed up Schelling’s conclusions, ‘The 
odyssey of consciousness ends, not with any grand 
rationalization of the universe nor with the transition 
to any timeless and final logical language 
underpinning all, but with a recognition of the finite 
and fragmented textures of empirical reality and the 
multiplicity of its partial intelligible schemata.’ 
(Vater, 1978, p.xxxv)  Schelling later argued that 
there is an ‘unprethinkable being’ (unvordenkliches 
Sein) that precedes all thought, within which all 
thought takes place, which is eternally beyond our 
complete grasp but which calls forth the quest to 
make intelligible the whole of existence (Schelling, 
1977, p.160). 
Schelling was ultimately concerned to make 
intelligible the free, self-conscious subject. He took 
volition as ontologically basic, but argued that will by 
itself could not become conscious of itself. Following 
Herder and Fichte, Schelling argued that such self-
consciousness is only possible through the recognition 
of the other. The self catches sight of itself in the 
mirror of the other and is defined or delimited by the 
other. It is only through this reflexivity that it can 
become a free, self-determining will (1978, p.163). 
But to explain the emergence of the autonomous self 
through reciprocal recognition it is first necessary to 
explain the existence of will. Schelling’s procedure 
was to subtract from self-consciousness to arrive at 
the lowest conceivable potential, and then construct 
the path upward through a successions of limits to 
show how the conscious self could emerge from this 
as its highest potential. The lowest potential arrived at 
was the ‘pure subject-object’, which Schelling 
equated with nature, and, he claimed, the 
‘unconscious’ stages through which consciousness 
emerges can only become conscious to an ‘I’ which 
has developed out of them and realizes its dependence 
upon them.   
This approach led Schelling to conceive nature as 
essentially self-constraining or limiting activity, 
simultaneously ‘productivity’ (or process) and 
‘products’. Insofar as nature is productivity, it is 
subject; insofar as it is product, it is object. He 
compared nature to a stream: 
A stream flows in a straight line as long as it meets 
no resistance. Where there is resistance an eddy 
appears. Each original Product of Nature, each 
organization, acts like such an eddy. For example, 
the eddy is not static, but constantly changeable – but 
in each instant reproduces itself anew. Therefore no 
Product in Nature is fixed, but in each instant is 
renewed by the power of the whole of Nature (what 
we see is not the existing, but the constant 
Reproducing of the Products of Nature) (Schelling, 
1856-61, Vol.III, p.18; trans. White, 1996, p.41.). 
As Schelling conceived it, productivity consists in 
opposed activities limiting each other. He proclaimed, 
‘give me a nature made up of opposed activities … 
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and from that I will bring forth for you the 
intelligence, with the whole system of its 
presentations’ (1978, p.72). From opposed activities 
emerge force and matter, space and time, chemicals 
and non-living and living organisms. Whatever 
product or form exists is in perpetual process of 
forming itself. According to Schelling, the process of 
self-constitution or self-organization, rather than 
being a marginal phenomenon, must be the primal 
ground of all reality (Heuser-Kessler, 1986). Causal 
‘community’ in which a whole maintains itself by 
reciprocal causation, instead of being treated as a 
derivative form of causation, as in Kant, was taken as 
the primary form of causation, with the cause-effect 
relations of mechanistic thought taken as derivative. 
Dead matter, in which product prevails over 
productivity, is a result of the stable balance of forces 
where products have achieved a state of indifference. 
Organisms are self-organizing beings in which 
productivity cannot easily maintain products in a state 
of indifference. Living organisms differ from non-
living organisms in that their complexity makes it 
even more difficult to maintain a state of indifference; 
they are characterized by irritability. They must 
respond to changes in their environments creatively to 
form and reform themselves as products. The senses 
become an essential component of such creative 
response. Sentient life is the condition for the 
emergence of spirit, with its social forms and history. 
With spirit, we have intersubjectivity, the experience 
of world as objective, and the emergence of freedom 
to choose evil or good. Evil is the domination of the 
blind self-seeking urge. It is creative power out of 
control; but without such power there would be no 
existence and no good (Schelling, 1954). The 
potential for good comes with the self-consciousness 
that emerges with social relationships that limit, and 
facilitate the self-limitation, of this creative power.  
 
VI. PROCESS PHILOSOPHY FROM SCHELLING TO 
WHITEHEAD 
While Schelling’s philosophy contains much more 
than has been presented here and is notoriously 
difficult to interpret, it is not difficult to see in it the 
precursor to the evolutionary cosmologies and 
theories of emergence of Alexander, Lloyd Morgan 
and Whitehead. But Schelling’s philosophy was also 
the precursor to the evolutionary cosmologies of 
Engels, Herbert Spencer, C.S. Peirce and the 
pragmatists, Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov and 
Ludwig von Bertalanffey. While the influence is often 
indirect, all these thinkers have been grappling with 
the same fundamental problem and are indebted in 
one way or another, directly or indirectly, to 
Schelling. All such thinkers have emphasized the 
primary reality of process over things. They can all be 
characterized, as Schelling characterized his own 
philosophy, as ‘neither materialism nor spiritualism, 
neither realism nor idealism’ but as overcoming these 
divisions. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead 
should be seen as later developments of this tradition. 
Appreciating this enables the ideas of all such 
thinkers to be understood as part of a developing 
tradition of thought, and the various contributions of 
each can then be evaluated accordingly, rather than 
being seen as particular reactions against the 
mechanical view of the world or against ‘idealism’.  
However, Schelling’s influence extends beyond 
philosophers striving to develop an evolutionary 
cosmology. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie has had a 
tremendous influence on science. Oersted’s work on 
chemistry and electro-magnetism was strongly 
influenced by Schelling (Gower, 1973). The principle 
of ‘conservation of energy’ was formulated by 
scientists who had been influenced by Schelling 
(Kuhn, 1977). And many of the anti-reductionist 
developments in biology were inspired by 
Naturphilosophie. That is, efforts to construe nature 
to make intelligible the emergence of consciousness 
have proved enormously fruitful in the natural 
sciences, largely displacing mechanistic thinking in 
physics. Conversely, Schelling had a major influenced 
on philosophers and social and cultural theorists 
reacting against Hegelian and neo-Kantian ‘idealism’ 
and the ‘idealist’ tendencies in Husserl (Gare, 2002). 
Directly and indirectly, Feuerbach and Marx were 
strongly influenced by Schelling, as were Friedrich 
Ast (a founder of hermeneutics), Kierkegaard, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Bakhtin, 
Deleuze and Zizek. Appreciating the roots of all these 
thinkers and the schools of thought they inspired in 
Schelling’s philosophy enables their achievements to 
be appreciated as basically consistent with and 
possible contributions to the development of process 
metaphysics (Gare, 2002). 
 In this context, how should we view the work of 
Whitehead? In Process and Reality Whitehead 
characterized his work as based upon a recurrence of 
the phase of philosophical thought that began with 
Descartes and ended with Hume, praising in particular 
the work of Locke. While Whitehead claimed to be 
influenced by these thinkers, he was attempting to 
identify where philosophy went awry. As I have 
suggested, Whitehead was more immediately 
influenced by Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, who 
themselves belonged to a longer tradition of dynamic 
thinking in opposition to mechanistic thought. 
Whitehead was also influenced by ideas from physics, 
including Maxwell’s electro-magnetic theories, 
thermodynamics, relativity theory and quantum 
theory that were developments of, or were only 
intelligible in terms of ideas going back to Leibniz 
and Schelling. Whitehead aligned himself with 
biologists opposed to the reduction of living beings to 
complex machines (Whitehead, 1968, Lecture Eight). 
He was strongly influenced by Romantic poetry. And 
he was indirectly influenced by Schelling through the 
writings of Lossky and the philosophy of Bradley 
(who, while usually characterized as an Hegelian, was 
in some ways closer to Schelling). What I am 
suggesting, and what I have argued in more detail 
elsewhere, is that while Whitehead in Process and 
Reality defined his work in relation to philosophers 
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such as Descartes, Locke and Hume, his originality 
came from developing the tradition of 
Naturphilosophie (Gare, 2002).  
Whitehead, along with Peirce, is particularly 
important to this tradition as a logician and 
philosopher of mathematics. Developing, spelling out 
the implications of and deploying the new symbolic 
logic of relations, Whitehead and Peirce dispelled 
some of the biases against process thinking and 
considered again the place of mathematics in a world 
of processes. The core of Whitehead’s metaphysics 
can be taken as an effort to defend speculative 
philosophy and to reformulate an organic view of the 
world to accord with these developments in logic and 
mathematics, thereby making it a more rigorous and 
defensible position. He acknowledged that one of his 
main concerns in Process and Reality was to rescue 
the type of thought exemplified by Bergson, William 
James and John Dewey from the charge of anti-
intellectualism (Whitehead, 1978, p.xii)). The result 
was a philosophy with striking resemblances to 
Schelling’s, particularly in his analysis of the relation 
between subject and object and his theology, but 
which offers a far more detailed analysis of the proto-
mental and proto-material aspects of process and of 
the relationship between process, logic and 
mathematics. 
What then can we say about Whitehead’s theory of 
emergence? What I have tried to show is that 
Whitehead, developing the tradition of 
Naturphilosophie, took it for granted that a 
cosmology must give a central place to emergence. It 
is also clear that he was not entirely satisfied with this 
aspect of his own philosophy. But his comments also 
reveal the extent to which Whitehead conceived his 
work to be exploratory rather than a finally completed 
system of thought. Like most great thinkers, 
Whitehead himself was a revisionist, constantly 
questioning and revising his own ideas, and would 
surely be much more sympathetic to revisionists 
amongst those he inspired than to orthodox exponents 
of his philosophy. Whitehead’s philosophy needs 
revision to provide a better theory of emergence.  
 
VII. BEYOND WHITEHEAD, OR, BACK TO SCHELLING 
From the point of view of those attempting to revise 
Whitehead’s philosophy to give a more adequate 
place to emergence there are two main problems. The 
first pertains to Whitehead’s tendency on his own 
admission to grant only a derivative status to 
composite entities, the societies of actual occasions. 
The second pertains to Whitehead’s doctrine of 
eternal objects, conceiving the realm of pure 
possibilities for definiteness such that any new 
developments in the world must be seen as realizing 
pre-existent possibilities. 
While the problematic status of compound entities has 
engaged a number of process philosophers (Leclerc, 
1986; Bracken 1994), the most radical revision of 
Whitehead’s ‘atomism’ has been Lewis Ford’s recent 
suggestion that we recognize a plurality of levels of 
occasions, with smaller occasions being included in 
larger occasions, influenced by these larger occasions 
in the forms of definiteness they select while being 
prehended by the larger occasions in their own 
concrescence (Moses, 1997). Ford also wants to allow 
overlapping in the becoming of occasions. Although 
he does not refer to Bergson, his revision of 
Whitehead has led him to a Bergsonian conception of 
multiple, interacting levels of duration (Capek, 1971, 
p.159).  
In relation to eternal objects, Murray Code, a leading 
expositor of Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics, 
argues that if nature is to be characterized as ‘creative 
advance’, then ‘so called’ eternal objects should be 
seen as evolving also (Code, 1995; Code, 1999; Code 
2002). He suggests that we recognize imagination as 
an indispensable activity woven into the very fabric of 
process, and proposes that we reinterpret Whitehead’s 
eternal objects as components of the semiosis as 
analysed by Peirce. According to Peirce, semiosis is 
triadic, consisting of a sign, an object and an 
interpretant, which in turn becomes a sign for further 
interpretation. Allowing for interpretation grants a 
place to imagination and the appreciation of new 
possibilities of the object interpreted. Code, following 
Peirce, suggests that a generalizing tendency (that is, 
a tendency to generate proto- ‘eternal objects’) could 
have originated within a world of chaos with vague 
signs, inviting imaginative interpretation, beginning 
what became a universal process of semiosis. 
Originally there would have been almost blind 
habitual interpretation characteristic of the inanimate 
world, with almost no entertainment of new 
possibilities. However, further evolution of nature 
from primitive life forms to humans could have led to 
the increasingly imaginative interpretations 
generating new possibilities to challenge habitual 
interpretations of situations. The generation by 
mathematicians of the realm of formal possibilities is 
one of the recent achievements of semiotic 
imagination. Code argues that such semiosis requires 
organisms as characterized by Whitehead to be the 
bearers of interpretations. Presumably, prehension 
should be seen as involving imaginative 
interpretation. 
Reformulated in this way, Whitehead’s philosophy 
accords more closely with the Schellingian tradition 
of natural philosophy. However, this tradition also 
contributes important elements to the Whitehead 
tradition of process thought. Previously I noted that 
those who have attempted to analyse human 
experience and to take this as the core of their 
philosophies can be divided firstly between those who 
begin with the experience of the individual and those 
who argue that human experience as self-reflexive is 
essentially social and related to others; and secondly, 
between those who assume an essentially 
contemplative notion of consciousness and those who 
insist that experience is first and foremost associated 
with practical engagement with the world. Whitehead, 
despite his emphasis on the relational nature of actual 
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occasions and on the self-constituting character or 
societies of actual occasions, tends to assume that 
experience is of contemplative individuals. And there 
is little appreciation of the active role of others in the 
constitution of either actual occasions or societies. For 
instance, there is no place for the prehesion or 
appreciation of other actual occasions as co-becoming 
subjects (Whitehead, 1933, p.178). And there is no 
place given to struggle between societies of actual 
occasions to preserve themselves against the 
resistances, assertions or even threats of others. 
Correspondingly, there is little consideration of how 
new forms of cooperation develop between co-
becoming societies and no place given to struggle in 
the development of cognition. Whitehead 
characterized life and then human life in terms of 
different grades of mentality, but he did not provide 
the means to explain these qualitative differences, 
merely attributing these to the development of 
potentialities inherent in actual occasions. Schelling’s 
starting point, by contrast, is emphatically of 
practically engaged, socially constituted individuals. I 
believe that Schelling was basically right on this 
issue, and that this led Schelling to crucial insights 
about the nature of existence and of emergence, not 
contained in Whitehead’s philosophy, which since 
have been fruitfully developed by other thinkers. 
As we have seen, Schelling saw self-consciousness 
emerging through the limiting of the particular will by 
other people, and then generalized this notion of limit 
to characterize the evolution of nature from infinite 
activity to force to matter to non-living organisms to 
life and finally, to the human spirit (Schelling, 1978, 
p.68ff.). Each stage from infinite activity onwards 
was seen to involve further limits. Such notions 
contributed to the development of the notion of 
energy and to the notion of opposing forces within 
science, ideas now central to both modern physics and 
modern chemistry. Schelling argued that with 
organization, matter has become a means and it is the 
maintenance of form or figure that has become 
essential (Schelling, 1994, p.122ff.). This involves a 
new kind of limit. Although only sketched briefly by 
Schelling, this idea has been developed recently in 
hierarchy theory in which nature is conceived to be 
organized by hierarchies of constraints (Pattee, 1973; 
Salthe, 1993, Ahl and Allen, 1996). An atom 
constrains or limits the activity of its component sub-
atomic components, a crystal constrains or limits the 
activity of its component atoms, and a plant 
constrains or limits the activity of its component 
chemicals and interchanges with its environment to 
generate and develop biological form, itself an 
enduring constraint. Living beings are hierarchies of 
constrained and constraining activities generating and 
maintaining a multiplicity of mutually supporting 
forms. While spatial scale immediately springs to 
mind when characterizing these different levels, 
hierarchy theorists have found temporal scale to be 
more important. Higher levels reproduce themselves 
over longer durations than lower levels. 
Limits produced by the interactions of co-becoming 
processes appear to be central to the development of 
sentience. As we have seen, Schelling characterized 
living beings as inherently unbalanced and thereby of 
necessity actively engaged with their environments. 
‘[L]ife must be thought of as engaged in a constant 
struggle against the course of nature, or in an 
endeavour to uphold its identity against the latter’ 
Schelling wrote (Schelling, 1978, p.127). Living 
beings must respond to changes in their environments 
creatively to form and reform themselves as products. 
This characterization of life concurs with recent 
notions of dissipative structures which develop in 
systems thermodynamically far from equilibrium and 
of autopoesis or self-making. Schelling argued that 
higher developments of life are associated with 
greater imbalances, requiring of organisms greater 
awareness of the world around them, more active 
responses to this world and greater levels of 
creativity. The senses are an essential component of 
such creative activity. From senses that gave 
organisms an awareness of their immediate 
environment, organisms have evolved other senses 
enabling them to perceive at successively greater 
distances.  
These ideas have been developed within a tradition of 
anti-mechanist biology inspired by the Schellingian 
biologist, K.E. von Baer (Gould, 1977, p.60f.; Kull, 
1998). Developing von Baer’s ideas, Jacob von 
Uexküll argued that to understand organisms it is 
necessary to understand their surrounding worlds. He 
analysed the constitution of these worlds, showing 
how the perception world and the action world of 
organisms are related through function circles (for 
food, for enemies, and so on) to constitute first their 
surrounding worlds (umwelten), and then through the 
coordination and relating of perception and action in 
different function circles, to inner worlds. By 
studying the function circles of each organism he 
revealed the distinctive worlds of different organisms, 
showing how 'there are as many surrounding worlds 
as animals' (von Uexküll, 1926, p.176). Von 
Uexküll’s ideas helped inspire and strongly 
influenced the science of ethology, philosophical 
biology, and more recently, biosemiotics, each of 
which have sought to trace the stages of development 
of these worlds leading to the reflexive consciousness 
of humans (Lorenz 1977; Jonas 1976; Hoffmeyer, 
1996). Interpreting von Uexküll’s notion of 
surrounding world through Peirce’s semiotics and 
hierarchy theory, the biosemioticians have identified 
the emergence of life with the emergence of semiosis 
(Lemke, 2000). Radicalizing von Uexküll’s 
arguments, they have argued that plants also have 
surrounding worlds as their growth is based on 
interpreting signs (Kull, 2000). Animals, as distinct 
from plants, are characterized by motility. Jonas 
argued that this is associated with perception and 
emotion (Jonas, 1976). The ability to move about and 
perceive over a distance discloses a world of 
possibilities to the organism, while opening up a 
temporal dimension within which possibilities can be 
appreciated, responded to and realized through 
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movement of the whole organism. That is, there is a 
new level of organization in which interaction 
between organism and environment is constrained by 
perceptual appreciation of possibilities and 
concomitant emotions. Animals from amoeba to 
chimpanzees can be characterized in terms of the 
possibilities they can identify, that is, the complexity 
of their worlds, their emotional engagement with 
these worlds and their possibilities, and the 
complexity of actions these organisms are capable of 
to realize desired possibilities.  
This conception of living organisms provides the 
basis for defining the specific characteristics of 
humans. With humans we have much more complex 
forms of semiosis facilitating greater levels of 
intersubjectivity and reflexivity, the transcendence of 
egocentic perspectives and the appearance of the 
world as objective, shared by other subjects (the 
mitwelt). That is, with humanity we have the 
emergence of culture. These developments make 
possible customs, institutions, religions, laws, science, 
art and philosophy transcending individuals and 
constraining their activities. These are the constraints, 
associated with mutual recognition, which enable 
individuals to see themselves from the perspective of 
others and so to become reflexively conscious of 
themselves (so developing a self-world or eigenwelt), 
to critically reflect on their cultural heritage, to 
develop their own beliefs and to live according to 
these. That is, people are able to develop minds of 
their own whereby they constrain their own activities 
and lives according to their beliefs, thereby becoming 
truly free. Elaborated in this way, Schelling’s 
conception of life and human consciousness not only 
provides a framework to situate the ideas of later 
process philosophers but also a naturalistic foundation 
for rethinking the immensely rich tradition of social, 
political and ethical philosophy inspired by Hegel. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The argument of this paper has been that modern 
process philosophy can be understood as the response 
to the major problem engendered by the triumph of 
mathematical physics following Descartes and 
Newton. While mathematical physics was immensely 
successful in explaining aspects of the physical world, 
it made consciousness virtually unintelligible. The 
proposed solutions to this problem while accepting 
mathematical physics at face value as a 
characterization of physical existence are incoherent. 
Taking seriously the reality of consciousness, some 
philosophers have argued that physical existence as 
analysed by physicists is a mere appearance. As the 
mechanical view of the world successfully advanced 
into biology, this strategy lost its plausibility. Other 
philosophers took a more radical approach and argued 
that nature must be such that consciousness could 
have emerged from it and that science should be 
developed on new metaphysical foundations 
accordingly. This is what began the modern tradition 
of process philosophy. Whitehead should be 
understood as part of this tradition and an exponent of 
the emergent theory of mind. However, although 
there is ample evidence that in elaborating his 
metaphysics Whitehead intended to provide a basis 
for the emergent theory of mind, in fact his 
philosophy was defective in this regard. My argument 
is that rather than retreating from the emergent theory 
of mind, process philosophers should appreciate the 
contributions of other thinkers in this tradition and 
reformulate process philosophy accordingly.  
While the focus of this paper has been on the 
emergent theory of mind and the conditions for 
developing such a theory, my purpose is much 
broader. My intention has been to show why the 
tradition of process philosophy should be regarded as 
the most promising grand research program available 
for understanding the world and our place within it as 
well as for orienting us to act and to live in this world. 
It is a tradition that originated with Herder and 
Schelling and encompasses the most vital 
developments in philosophy and science up to the 
present. When appreciated as such the history of 
philosophy over the last three hundred years becomes 
far more intelligible as thinkers reacting against 
scientific materialism and against neo-Kantian, 
Hegelian or Husserlian ‘idealism’ are located within 
this tradition and the inter-relationships between their 
ideas appreciated. As such it is an active tradition 
facing immense challenges, both intellectual and 
practical. But these do not appear insurmountable. Of 
course there are reasons for embracing process 
philosophy other than its ability to make intelligible 
the emergence of reflexive human consciousness from 
nature. Process philosophy holds promise for 
advancing the physical and biological sciences. It 
provides a basis for integrating developments in the 
natural and human sciences and for overcoming the 
division between the sciences and the humanities. 
Most importantly, it overcomes the nihilism of 
modernity, justifying the ethics, social philosophy, 
political philosophy and/or theology which seems to 
be required to confront the challenges confronting 
humanity, not least the global ecological crisis. But 
what the mind-body issue highlights is that the 
alternatives to process philosophy are just silly.  
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